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Introduction
When asked to indicate which items from a set of candi-
dates belong to a particular category, inter-individual differ-
ences appear: Individuals disagree on the items that should
be considered category members (e.g., Black, 1937; Hamp-
ton, Dubois, & Yeh, 2006; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978).
Individuals might disagree about whether hiking and/or darts
are sports, for instance. We will argue that inter-individual
differences in semantic categorization come in two kinds. (i)
Qualitative differences reflect a different organization of the
candidate items with respect to the target category. (ii) Quan-
titative differences reflect a different propensity to endorse
items as category members.
Qualitative differences represent different views on what
are considered representative category members. Individu-
als who consider hiking a better example of sports than darts
presumably find that the former meets the requirements of
category membership better than the latter does. They, for
instance, recognize that hiking is physically more demanding
than darts is. Individuals who consider darts to be the better
example must then employ different requirements for cate-
gory membership. When judging category membership they
place more emphasis on elements such as rules or competi-
tion, for instance. These requirements are better met by darts
than by hiking.
Among individuals who agree on the organization of items
with respect to the target category, categorization differences
of a quantitative nature can arise. These are differences that
pertain to the propensity to endorse items as category mem-
bers. The item organization reflects the varying extents to
which the items fulfill the requirements for category mem-
bership (e.g., hiking is physically more demanding than darts
is). Certain individuals might want to see more evidence of
these requirements than others. They might only deem hiking
physical enough to be considered a sport, while others find
both darts and hiking demanding enough.
Model
Our goal is to elucidate these two kinds of inter-individual
categorization differences by means of the mixture item re-
sponse theory model (Mislevy & Verhelst, 1990; Rost, 1990)
that is expanded in Equation (1). Models like these are tradi-
tionally employed to assess individuals’ aptitudes and dispo-
sitions in response to a number of test items. However, they
have also been shown to be flexible tools to analyze semantic
categorization data (e.g., Verguts, De Boeck, & Storms, 1998;
Verheyen, Hampton, & Storms, 2010).
Here the model will be used to partition a large sample of
categorizers in a number of groups that are maximally differ-
ent in terms of their organization of the items with respect to
the target category. These item organizations take the shape
of scales along which all candidate items are positioned ac-
cording to their likelihood of being endorsed. Different or-
ganizations capture qualitative categorization differences be-
tween participants from different groups: They reveal how
a particular item might be a likely category member in one
group, but an unlikely category member in another group.
Participants that end up together in a group are understood
to adopt the same item organization. These categorizers do
not differ qualitatively, but can display varying degrees of
propensity to endorse items as category members. These are
inter-individual categorization differences of a quantitative
nature. In the formal framework they take the shape of crite-
ria that are imposed on the scales that organize the candidate
items: They reveal how some individuals in a group might
use very liberal criteria, while others employ very stringent
criteria.
Binary categorization decisions Yci constitute the input for
the model. Here the categorization data are comprised of
member/non-member decisions Y by 250 categorizers c to-
wards 24 items i in each of 8 natural language categories (fish,
fruits, furniture, insects, sciences, sports, tools, vegetables).
Every one of these categorization decisions is considered
the outcome of a Bernoulli trial with the probability of a mem-
ber response:




In Equation (1) the betas capture the organization of the items
with respect to the target category. g groups of categorizers
are extracted, with separate item organizations that are max-
imally different. For each group the organization takes the
shape of a scale along which all candidate items are posi-
tioned. βg,i indicates the position of item i along the scale
for group g. Higher values for βg,i indicate likelier category
members.
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The thetas in Equation (1) capture the degree of liberal-
ness/conservatism categorizers display. A separate indication
of the propensity to endorse items as category members is
extracted for each categorizer c. It takes the shape of a crite-
rion that is positioned along the same scale that organizes the
items for the group the participant belongs to. θgc indicates
the position of the criterion for categorizer c along the scale
for group g. Higher values for θgc indicate more conservative
categorizers.
Unlike the betas and thetas, the alphas in Equation (1) can
only take on positive values. A separate αg for each group
determines the shape of the response function that relates the
unbounded difference βg,i−θgc to the probability of a mem-
ber response (bounded between 0 and 1). Indeed, the relative
position of item and criterion along a scale determines the
probability of a member response. If βg,i equals θgc the nu-
merator of Equation (1) takes on the value of 1, while the
denominator takes on the value of 2. The resulting probabil-
ity is .50, indicating that the categorization decision can go
either way. The odds change when item and criterion have
a different position along the scale. If the item surpasses the
criterion, the odds are that the categorizer will endorse it. The
greater the distance between item and criterion, the greater
the odds of a member decision. If the item does not surpass
the criterion, the odds are that c will not endorse i. Under this
circumstance, the odds of a non-member decision increase
with the distance between item and criterion.
The one-group variant of the model in Equation (1) has
been applied to semantic categorization by Verheyen et al.
(2010). That particular model only allows for quantitative
inter-individual categorization differences. Participants can
differ in terms of the categorization criterion they employ, but
not in terms of the scale along which the criteria are placed.
They all adopt the same category organization. The model in
Equation (1) is more general. It allows for qualitative differ-
ences in addition to quantitative ones. It relaxes the assump-
tion that all participants adhere to the same category organiza-
tion. Instead, it assumes that the participants divide in groups
with a different item organization each. (One set of beta esti-
mates is extracted for each group.) Within each group, indi-
viduals are still thought to differ in terms of the employed cat-
egorization criterion. (A theta estimate is extracted for every
categorizer.) The model in Equation (1), then, is a mixture of
differently parameterized quantitative differences-only mod-
els of the kind employed by Verheyen et al. (2010).
Findings
The analysis of the categorization data with the mixture
model in Equation (1) yields evidence for both qualitative
and quantitative inter-individual differences. For the cate-
gories of fish, insects, sciences, sports, and tools the sam-
ple of categorizers divides in distinct groups, who regard dif-
ferent items likely category members (i.e., qualitative differ-
ences). Within each of these groups categorizers differ in
their propensity to provide membership responses (i.e., quan-
titative differences). The existence of multiple item organiza-
tions for a single category suggests that it might be improper
to assume a default category representation that is the same
for all language users. Rather, it would appear that there
exist a number of these default representations, which em-
phasize different sets of category features. Indeed, a clear
pattern emerged when we (i) determined to what extent fea-
tures that participants consider important for category mem-
bership are true of the different candidate items, (ii) obtained
a small number of principal components that convey the in-
formation that is contained in these feature applicability judg-
ments, and (iii) regressed the item organizations of different
groups upon these principal components. For each of the cat-
egories with multiple item organizations, there was at least
one component that had a similar effect on every item orga-
nization. Common components indicate agreement among
groups on what it means to be a category member. This is
required for members of different groups to succesfully com-
municate with one another using the studied natural language
terms. The item organizations could also be distinguished on
the basis of other components that were of importance to sin-
gle subgroups only. These distinct components indicate dis-
agreement among groups on what it means to be a category
member but do not appear to hamper communication between
members of different groups.
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